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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
PROPERTY-TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY-RESULTING 
TRUSTS-PROOF OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TENANTS 
HELD SUFFICIENT TO REBUT GIFT PRESUMPTION AND ESTAB-
LISH RESULTING TRUST IN FAVOR OF PURCHASING SPOUSE, 
ENSOR V. ENSOR, 270 Md. 549, 312 A.2d 286 (1973). 
Despite an increasing divorce rate, many American couples continue 
to conduct financial and property transactions with the optimistic 
assumption that their marriage will prevail. For example, married per-
sons who desire to share their individual assets with their spouse often 
place their property in a tenancy by the entirety,1 which enables them 
to alleviate personal liability risks, and also facilitates estate settlement 
at the death of either spouse. Problems arise, however, if marital bliss 
diminishes, divorce proceedings are commenced, and the spouses re-
quest the return of their financial investments in the marriage. The 
parties to the recent Maryland case of Ensor v. Ensor'- found them-
selves in this situation. 
Mrs. Ensor used her separate funds to provide the down payment for 
a house deeded to her husband and herself as tenants by the entirety. 
The money involved was the proceeds from a judgment which awarded 
her damages for injuries suffered in anaccident.3 The couple was later 
divorced, whereupon Mrs. Ensor brought an action against her former 
1. "A tenancy by the entirety is an estate held by husband and wife as a unity ... and may 
exist ... in any interest in land which may be owned by. the marital Unity subject to 
survivorship." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.6, at 23 (A. J. CASNER ed.1952. The estate 
by the entirety differs from the joint tenancy in that neither party has an individual 
interest which he can convey. Any conveyance must be executed by both parties jointly. 
Thus the right of survivorship of one party cannot be defeated by the action of the other. 
[d. at 27. In many jurisdictions it is held that neither spouse has any specific interest 
which he can encumber, or which a creditor can attach for satisfaction of a debt. [d. at 29. 
Maryland is among these- jurisdictions. See, e.g., Annapolis Banking and Trust Co. v. 
Neilson, 164 Md. 8, 164 A. 157 (1933). See generally Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 
167, 98 A. 537 (1916), for a:discussion of the tenancy by the entirety in Maryland. Personal 
property, as well as realty, may be held by the entirety in this state. See, e.g., Beard v. 
Beard, 185 Md. 178, 44 A.2d 469 (1945). 
Some jurisdictions do not recognize the estate by the entirety. See, e.g., Faye v. 
Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N.W. 369 (1926); Farmers and Merchants' Bank v. Wallace, 
45 Ohio St. 952, 12 N.E. 439 (1887); Helvie v. Hoover, 11 Okla. 687, 69 P. 958 (1902). 
Others have held that statutes abolishing joint tenancies or rights of survivorship, or 
raising a rebuttable presumption of a tenancy in common as to concurrent estates, apply 
to estates by the entirety. See; e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Lawrence, 212 Ala. 45, 101 So. 
663 (1924); Swan v. Walden,156 Cal. 195, 103 P. 931 (1909); Wilson v. WilsOn, 43 Minn. 
398,45 N.W. 710 (1890). But the Maryland cases of Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 
161, 98 A. 537 (1916); Brewer v. Bowersox, 92 Md. 567, 48 A. 1060 (1901); and Marburg v. 
Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878), indicate that MD. ANN CODE Real Prop. Art., § 2-117 (1974), 
which creates a presumption against a joint tenancy, has no application to a tenancy by 
the entirety. 
2. 270 Md. 540, 312 A.2d 286 (1973). 
3. See Ensor v. Ortman, 243 Md. 81, 220 A.2d 82 (1966), for an account of the incident in 
which the damages were recovered. 
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husband for sale in lieu of partition4 of the property. After the decree 
of sale, she flIed a claim asserting that she had invested her money in 
the realty under an agreement with her husband wherein he would 
recognize her contribution as her sole and separate property and would 
return it to her in the future as she might desire.s 
At the equity proceedings, the testimony of Mrs. Ensor's sister 
substantiated this assertion. The sister said that she was present in the 
Ensor home when the couple discussed what to do with Mrs. Ensor's 
award from the judgment. She stated that Mr. Ensor acknowledged in 
her presence that the money belonged to his wife. She further testified 
that the couple agreed to preserve the money for Mrs. Ensor's future 
medical care, since her injurie~ from the accident might require addi-
tional treatment. The couple then decided on an investment in real 
estate as the best way to provide for this possibility, she said.6 
The chancellor was impressed with the sister's testimony as com-
pared with that of Mr. Ensor, as well as with the fact that Mrs. Ensor's· 
requirements for future medical care provided a sound reason for the 
agreement.7 He found that the parties had made an agreement that Mrs. 
Ensor's contribution to the purchase of the property was an investment 
in trust for her ultimate use and benefit.8 Consequently, he held that 
the presumption of a gift normally arising when a wife pays for 
property conveyed to her husband and herself as tenants by the 
entirety had been rebutted, and a resulting trust had been established in 
Mrs. Ensor's favor. 9 A decree was accordingly issued which entitled 
Mrs. Ensor to the return of her down payment from the proceeds of the 
sale of the property and to one half of the remaining balance. J 0 
In affirming the decree, the Maryland Court of Appeals rendered, for 
the first time, a decision declaring a resulting trust in favor of a wife of 
funds she had invested in property which was placed, with her consent, 
in a tenancy by the entirety. J J 
4. It is generally held in Maryland that when a decree of absolute divorce makes no 
disposition of property held in a tenancy by the entirety the spouses become tenants in 
common of such property. See, e.g., Brucker v. Benson, 209 Md. 247, 121 A.2d 230 (1956); 
Meyers v. East End Loan and Sav. Ass'n, 139 Md. 607, 116 A. 453 (1922). MD. ANN. CODE 
Real Prop Art., § 14-107 (1974), provides in part that any tenant in common has the right 
to secure separate enjoyment of his interest either by partition or by sale and division of 
the proceeds. 
5. 270 Md. at 550, 312 A.2d at 287. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 4 (1971) provides that a 
married woman may hold property for her separate use as though she were not married 
and has the same power to dispose of it as husbands have to dispose of their property. 
6. 270 Md. at 551-52, 312 A.2d at 287-88. See also Record at 12-17, Ensor v. Ensor, 270 Md. 
549, 31~ A.2d 286 (1973). 
7. 270 Md. at 550-51, 312 A.2d at 287. 
8. Id. at 552, 312 A.2d at 288. 
9. Record at 32-34, Ensor v. Ensor, 270 Md. 549, 312 A.2d 286 (1973). The chancellor quoted 
and relied on language from Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690,692-93,72 A. 414,415 (1909). See 
p. 165· infra for full quotation from Reed. 
10. 270 Md. at 552, 312 A.2d at 288. 
11. The Maryland courts.had previously held that the presumption of a gift in this situation 
could only be rebutted by proof of fraud or undue influence, see p. 168 infra. 
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The court held: 
[I] f it is established that one spouse furnished the consideration 
for the purchase of real estate and if it is further established 
that the land was conveyed to husband and wife as tenants by 
the entireties under an agreement or understanding between 
husband and wife that the real and exclusive ownership should 
be in the spouse furnishing the consideration, the title of that 
spouse will be protected.1 2 
159 
While the court accepted the view that a presumption of a gift arises 
when property is purchased by a wife and deeded to both spouses as 
tenants by the entirety; 3 it rejected Mr. Ensor's contention that the 
presumption could be rebutted only by proof of fraud or undue 
influence. 1 4 Instead the court indicated that the presumption could 
also be negated by evidence of the wife's intention to retain the entire 
beneficial interest.1 S The court accepted the chancellor's finding that 
there was an agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Ensor that her invest-
ment in the prop(;!rty was an investment in trust,1 6 and deemed it 
sufficient to rebut the gift presumption.17 Furthermore, the court 
indicated, when the presumption of· a gift fails under these circum-
_ stances, the appropriate theory for relief lies in the application of the 
doctrine of resulting trusts,1 8 and thereby implicitly rejected the view 
of sQme authorities that a constructive trust should be imposed.1 9 . 
Resulting trusts and constructive trusts are, respectively, implied and 
imposed' by the courts, in appropriate circumstances, to compel a 
person holding legal title to property to surrender the property to 
another. The result is basically the same as would ensue under an 
express trust.2 0 A constructive trust arises when a person holding title 
to property would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain it.2 1 In the 
words of Justice Cardozo: "A constructive trust is the formula through 
which the conscience of equity finds expression. When property has 
. been acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal title 
may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity con-
12. 270 Md. at 562, 312 A.2d at 293. 
13. The court cited, among others, the Maryland cases of McCally v. McCally, 250 Md. 541, 
243 A.2d 538 (1968); Anderson v. Anderson, 215 Md. 483, 138 A.2d 880 (1958) and Gunter 
v. Gunter, 187 Md. 228, 49A.2d 454 (1946), to this effect. 270 Md. at 554-58,312 A.2d at 
288-90. 
14. 270 Md. at 556-57, 312 A.2d at 290-91. 
15. ld. at 561, 312 A.2D at 292-93, citing Rayher v. Rayher,14 N.J. 174. 101 A.2d 524 (1953). 
16. ld. at 562-63, 3i2 A.2d at 294. 
17. ld. at 561, 312 A.2d at 292-93. 
18. ld. at 561-62, 312 A.2d at 293. 
19. Costigan, The Classi/l'cation of Trusts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1914). 
20. See G. AND G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 451-71 (2d ed. i964) 
[hereinafter cited as BOGERT]; 5 A. SCO'M', THE OF TRUSTS §§ 404.2, 462.1 (3d ed. 
1967 [hereinafter cited as SCO'IT1 for a discussion of resulting and constluctive trusts. 
21. BOGERT § 471; 5 SCO'M' § 462. 
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verts him into a trustee.,,2 2 A resulting trust arises in favor of one who 
has transferred or caused property to be transferred to another when 
the circumstances surrounding the conveyance raise an inference that 
the transferor intended to convey bare legal title only, and had no 
intention of also giving up the beneficial interest.23 The major distinc-
tion between the two is that a constructive trust arises without regard 
to the intention of the person who transferred the property, while the 
existence of a resulting trust is dependent on that person's intention.2 4 
Although it is the true intention of the person who has paid for the 
property which governs whether a resulting trust exists, the courts have 
created presumptions as to this intention. The circumstances surround-
ing the conveyance are held to raise the inference that a resulting trust 
in f~vor of the payor was intended, or conversely, that the payor's 
intention was to make a gift to the person in whom the legal title is 
vested. An understanding of these presumptions is essential since the . 
parties to the litigation have the burden of presenting evidence suffi-
cient to overcome a presumption unfavorable to their cause.2 5 
The development of the presumptions regarding the payor's inten-
tion parallels the evolvement of the doctrine of resulting trusts. This 
doctrine had its genesis in the labyrinthalland conveyances of Medieval 
England. At that time, land was commonly held in the name of one 
person although another was entitled, by the express terms of the 
conveyance, to its beneficial use.26 When one person paid for property 
and placed the title in a legal stranger, without also expressly giving the 
stranger the beneficial use of the property, the courts naturally in-
ferred: (1) That the purchaser intended to follow the usual practice of 
placing the title to the land in one person and the beneficial use in 
another;27 and, (2) Since one normally expects to obtain property and 
services for money paid out, that the purchaser probably intended to 
keep the beneficial use for himself, not having expressly given it to 
anyone else.28 The courts accordingly decided that the gratuitous 
transferee held the land upon a resulting use, or in trust, for the person 
22. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919). 
23. 5 SCO'IT § 404.1. 
24. BOGERT § 451; 5 SCOTT §§ 440.1, 462.1. 
25. BOGERT § 454. 
26. BOGERT § 453; 5 SCO'IT § 404. 
Before that Statute [of Uses I there were three kinds of uses called resulting: 
(1) The typical resulting use was the one held to result where A., a fee simple owner, 
made a feoffment to B. and his heirs; But B. gave no consideration, and A. 
declared no use in favor of B. or of anyone else. 
(2) Another kind of resulting use was that which existed where A. paid the 
purchase money for a conveyance of land by B. and had B. make a feoffment in fee 
of the land to C., who was legally a stranger to A. 
(3) Closely akin to the first kind of resulting use was the use found to exist where A. 
made the feoffment to B. and his heirs to the use of or in trust to C. for life or on 
some other use which did not purport to dispose of the whole beneficial interest or 
on ·a use which failed for some reason to take effect and B. gave no consideration. 
Costigan, The Classification of Trusts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 437, 439-40 (1914). 
27. BOGERT § 454, at 513; 5 SCO'IT § 440, at 3309. 
28. Se~, for an explanation-ofthis rationale,In re Estate of Mahin,I61 Iowa 459,143 N.W. 420 
(1913); Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598,85 N.E. 945 (1908); Harveyv. Ledbetter, 48 Miss. 95 
(1873); Aborn v. Searles, 18 R.I. 357, 27 A. 796 (1893). 
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who had paid for it. Since the use or trust was not expressly declared, 
but reverted to the person who had paid for the land as a result of the 
circumstances surrounding the conveyance, it was called a resulting use 
or trust.2 9 
This practice provided the model for the modem purchase money 
resulting trust. When the circumstances surrounding a conveyance indi-
cate no intention on the part of the person who has paid for property 
to make a gift to the person in whom he placed the title, a purchase 
money resulting trust is presumed in most jurlsdictions,30 including 
Maryland.31 Since this trust arises by implication of law, the Statute of' 
Frauds is not applicable and it may be proved by parol evidence.32 
The person seeking to establish the resulting trust must first prove that 
he paid for the property. Since the presumption, being one of fact, is 
rebuttable, he must also overcome any evidence presented to show that 
a gift was intended.3 3 
29. BOGERT § 454, at 515-16; 5 SCOTT § 404, at 3212. 
30. BOGERT § 454, at 513; 5 SCOTT § 404, at 3310. See, e.g., Nasaroff v. National Union 
Fire'Ins. Co., 104 Cal. App. 551, 286 P. 486 (Dist. Ct. App. 1930); Shea v. Venuti, 346 
Mass. 780, 195 N.E.2d 532 (1964); Sanders v. Sanders, 357 Mo. 881, 211 S.W.2d 468 
(1948). 
The justification for this presumption in our time has been doubted. See, e.g., J. 
AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 431,434 (1913); Ames, Breach of Express Oral Trust 
of Land, 20 HARv. L.,REV, 549, 555-57 (1907). Even these authorities point out, however, 
that a statutory or otherwise conclusive presumption against a purchase money resulting 
trust is even less justifiable. Purchase money resulting trusts of land have been abolished 
in some states by statute. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 381.170 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 501.07-.09 (1947); N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAW § 7·1.3 (McKinney 1967). 
31. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 101 Md. 600,61 A. 210 (1905); Dryden v. Hanway, 31 Md. ,254 
(1869). 
32. Bogert notes that in the case of Anonymous, 2 Vent. 361 (1683), decided shortly after the 
adoption of the Statute of Frauds, Chancery held that a purchase money resulting trust 
was not within the seventh section of the Statute. BOGERT § 452, at 503. Additionally, 
Bogert states that: 
In the United States, wherever express trusts of realty are required to be 
manifested or proved by writing, there is a section or clause corresponding to the 
eighth section of the English Act excepting resulting trusts. No matter what the 
particular wording of these excepting clauses, the courts have been unanimous in 
holding that they were to cover all resulting and constructive trusts. Id. at 504. 
See, e.g., Fasman v. Pottashnick, 188 Md. 105,51 A. 664 (1947); Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Deale, 18 Md. 26 (1861) for Maryland caSes holding that resulting trusts are not required 
to be in writing. 
However, as was pointed out in Battle v. Allen, 250 Md. 672, 675, 245 A.2d 590, 591 
(1968): "Parol evidence may be sufficient to establish a resulting trust but the court will 
view it with great caution because it impeaches a document executed according to law 
and recorded as evidence of title." 
33. See BOGERT § 454, at 520; 5 SCOTT § 441, at 3326; id. § 458, at 3399. See generally 
Vogel v. Vogel, 157 Md. 147, 145 A. 370 (1929), for authority that the person attempting 
to establish a resulting trust must prove that he paid the purchase price. See also Mount. 
ford v. Mountford, 181 Md. 212, 29 A.2d 258 (1942); Powell v. McKenzie, 137 Md. 266, 
112 A. 290 (1920); Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Md. 44, 90 A. 846 (1914), as to the rebuttability of 
a resulting trust. 
One point of contention in Ensor was whether Mrs .. Ensor had met her burden of proof 
to establish a resulting trust. The court mentioned that a stringent test must be met 
before evidence may be deemed sufficient to establish a resulting trust, but upheld the 
chancellor's findings, pointing out his opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
witnesses. 270 Md. 549, 563,1312 A.2d 286, 293-94. Ensor thus sets no specific standaras 
for the form of agreement Or understanding which must be proved to establish a resulting 
trust, but gives the chancellor wide discretion. ::: 
.'. 
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The converse inference, that the payor intended to make a gift of the 
property to the person holding legal title, arises when the latter is 
related to the payor by blood. or marriage in such a way that he is a 
"natural object" of the payor's bounty. The essential question is 
whether the payor and donee share a relationship such that it would 
be natural for the payor to make gratuitous provisions for the donee.3 4 
According to one authority, the difficulty in applying this principle is 
that: 
So much depends not upon the formal relationship between the 
parties but upon their attitudes to each other. It is true that the 
rules adopted by the courts with respect to the various relation-
ships do not necessarily determine the final result, since they 
lay down presumptions which may be rebutted by further 
evidence. The presumptions, however, are given undue weight. 
Indeed, in some decisions it has been stated that they can be 
rebutted only by very strong, clear or even inclusive or indubit-
able evidence. Such a rule clearly gives too great weight to the 
relationship between the parties. The question is really one of 
intention as shown by all the circumstances. The notion that 
intention can be determined by the application of hard and fast 
rules of law is common in primitive systems of law, but it tends 
to disappear as courts and lawyers become more sophisti-
cated.3s 
Nevertheless, the majority of jurisdictions/ 6 including Maryland,3 7 
hold that when a husband purchases property and places it in the name 
of his wife a gift is presumed. When a wife purchases property in the 
name of her husband, the general rule is that a resulting trust is 
presumed.3 8 The distinction is made on the basis of the traditional 
social and economic roles of the husband and wife.39 Some jurisdic· 
tions,40 however, including Maryland,4 1 presume a gift where the wife 
has paid for the property on the basis of her moral duty to help her 
34. BOGERT § 459, 5 SCO'IT § 442. See also Weisberg v. Koprowski, 17 N.J. 362,111 A.2d 481 
(1955) for discussion of criterion. 
35. 5 SCO'IT § 442, at 3340. 
36. See, e.g., Fry v. National Savings and Trust Co., 289 F. 589 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Altramano 
v. Swan, 20 Cal. 2d 622,128 P.2d 353 (1942); Williams v. Thomas, 200 Ga. 767, 38 S.E.2d 
603 (1946); Sigel v. Sigel, 238 Mass. 587, 131 N.E. 316 (1921). 
37. See, e.g., Mountford v. Mountford, 181 Md. 212, 29 A.2d 258 (1942); Powell v. Mac-
Kenzie, 137 Md. 266, 112 A. 290 (1920). 
38. See, e.g., Keaton v. Pipkins, 43 F.2d 497 (lOth Cir. 1930); McKinnon v. McKinnon, 181 
Cal. App. 2d 97, 5 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1960); Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So. 2d 212 (Fla. App. 1971); 
Glover v. Waltham Laundry Co., 235 Mass. 330, 127 N.E. 420 (1920). But see Tenczar v. 
Tenczar, 332 Mass. 105, 123 N.E.2d 359 (1954); Bingham v. National Bank of Montana, 
105 Mont. 159, 72 P.2d 90 (1937); and cases cited in notes 40-42 infra for authority con-
tra. 
39. BOGERT § 459, at 579-86; 5 SCOTT § 442, at 3340. 
40. Adk~s v. Lee, 23 Conn. Super. 1, 175 A.2d 716 (1961); Hogan v. Hogan, 286 Mass. 524, 
190 N.E. 715 (1934); Bingham v. National Bank of Montana, 105 Mont. 159,72 P.2d 90 
(1937); Whitten v. Whitten, 70 W.Va. 422, 74 S.E. 237 (1912). 
41. See McCally v. McCally, 250 Md. 541,243 A.2d 538 (1968); Reed. v. Reed, l09'Md. 690, 
72 A. 414 (1909); Jenkins v. Middleton, 68 Md. 540, 13 A. 155 (1888); Farmers and 
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husband, the mutual affection presupposed between spouses, or a 
distaste for the presumption of a debtor-creditor relationship between 
husband and wife.4 2 
An additional circumstance affecting whether a presumption of a gift 
or a presumption of a resulting trust is declared by the court occurs 
when the purchaser of property places the title in another person and 
himself as tenants in common, joint tenants or tenants by the entirety. 
The very fact that the payor has expressly retained an interest for 
himself has been held by some courts to raise the presumption that he 
intended to make a gift of an undivided interest in the property to the 
other tenant.43 The basis 'for this inference is that, ordinarily, there 
would be no purpose in including the other party's name on the deed 
unless to vest in him such, interest as the conveyance on its face 
imported.44 Certainly the inference of a gift should be strengthened by 
this additional circumstance when the other party to the tenancy is a 
"natural object" of the bounty of the purchaser. 
When a wife is the purchaser of property which is placed in a tenancy 
by the entirety, the courts take three different positions on the pre-
sumption app~cable. The difference between these positions is appar-
ently a result of the courts' differing opinions as to whether or not the 
husband is a "natural object" of the wife's bounty. Thus some courts 
presume a resulting trust in favor of the wife if there is no evidence that 
the husband was intended to have a beneficial interest.45 Others 
presume a gift to the husband of an undivided interest and the right of 
survivorship unless there is evidence of a different intention of the 
wife.46 The third position holds that a gift to the husband is estab-
lished.47 
Whenever the presumption of a gift from the wife is employed, the 
Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins,65 Md. 245, 3 A. 302 (1886); Taylor v. Brown, 65 Md. 
366,4 A. 888 (1886). 
42. See, for general discussion of this point, 24 COL. L. REV. 325; 37 HARv. L. REV. 921; 16 ILL. 
L. REV. 529. For Maryland authority as to the rationale, see, e.g., Grover & Baker Sew-
ing Mach. Co. v. Radcliff, 63 Md. 496 (1885); Edelin v. Edelin, 11 Md. 415 (1857). 
43. See, e.g., Trimble v. Coffman, 114 Cal. App. 2d 618, 251 P.2rl 81 (1952); Mitchell v. 
Carrell, 321 Mass. 453, 73 N.E.2d 832 (1947); Honeycutt v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 242 
N.C. 734, 89 S.E.2d 598 (1955). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 441, 
comment e (1959) (quoted at p. 170 infra). 
44. BOGERT § 460, at 601-02; 5 SCOT!' § 441.4. 
45. See, e.g., Keen v. Larsen, 132 N.W.2d 350 (N.D. 1964) and cases in North Carolina 
where, largely by force of statute, a trust for the wife generally results, e.g., Wilson v. 
Ervin, 227 N. C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 
N. C. 411, 130 S.E. 45 (1925); Deese v. Deese 176 N: C. 527, 97 S.E. 475 (1918). 
46. See, e.g., Lux v. Hoff, 47 Dl. 425 (1868); Eagle v. McKown, 105 W. Va. 270, 142 S.E.65 
(1928); Wilber v. Wilber, 312 S.W.2d 86 (Mo. 1958). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS also takes this view. See § 441, comment e, cited at p. 170 infra. However, 
statutes abolishing resulting trusts may defeat the wife's claim even though the real un-
derstanding was that the land should belong to her alone. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Wenzel, 
166 Minn. 435,208 N.W. 184 (1926). 
47. See, e.g., Jones v. Wright, 230 Ark. 567, 323 S.W.2d 932 (1959); Fergueson v,. Stokes, 269 
S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1954); Legendre v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 215 S.C. 514. 66 
S.E.2d 336 (1949). 
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courts exhibit a strong tendency to protect her from the undue influ-
ence or fraud which might be practiced upon her by her husband. If 
evidence shows that the presumed gift was elicited under these circum-
stances, a constructive trust is declared in order to prevent the unjust 
enrichment of the husband.4 8 
A complication occurs in any case where the court has presumed a 
gift and the payor attempts to rebut the presumption with evidence 
that the payor and donee had orally agreed that the property was to be 
held in trust for the payor. The argument has been advanced that the 
oral agreement constitutes an attempted express trust, which is invalid 
under the Statute of Frauds.4 9 This proposition is generally rejected on 
the basis of the rationale which was articulated by the Supreme Court 
in the landmark case of Smithsonian Institution v. Meech: s 0 
The existence of an express agreement does not destroy the 
resulting trust .... [I] t was an agreement prior to the vesting 
of title-an agreement which became a part of and controlled 
the conveyance, and evidence of its terms is offered, not for the 
purpose of establishing an express trust, but of nullifying the 
presumption of an advancement, and to indicate the disposition 
which the ·real owner intended should be made of the prop-
erty.s 1 
The Court further determined that since a resulting trust is always 
presumed when one party pays for land conveyed to another, the 
presumption is merely pushed into the background when there is proof 
of a relationship between the payor and transferee sufficient to give 
rise to a presumption of a gift. Thus, when the gift presumption is later 
rebutted with evidence of an agreement by the transferee to hold as 
trustee for the payor, the original presumption of a resulting trust 
re-emerges as the proper remedy. 5 2 Other authorities, while agreeing 
that an oral agreement should not prevent enforcement of the trust, 
argue that the original presumption of a resulting trust can have no 
vitality after the inference of a trust has given way to demonstration of 
an express trust, through proof of a parol agreement. Instead, they 
contend that a constructive trust should be imposed on the person who 
attempts to unfairly retain the beneficial interest in property he has 
promised to hold in trust for the payor. 5 3 
Obviously a conflict over the beneficial ownership of property which 
48. See, e.g., LeCain v.Becker, 58 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 1952); Bell v. Bell, 210 Ga. 295, 79 S.E.2d 
524 (1954). See also Manos v. Papachrist,l99 Md. 257, 86 A.2d 474 (1952); Beard v. 
Beard, 185 Md. 178, 44 A.2d 469 (1945); Livingston v. Hall, 73 Md. 386, 21 A. 49 (1891). 
49. See, e.g., Smithsonian Institution v. Meech, 169 U.S. 398 (1898); Carillo v. O'Hara, 400 
Dl. 518, 81 N.E.2d 513 (1948); Liberty Trust Co. v. Hayes, 244 Mass. 251, 138 N.E. 582 
(1923}. 
SO. 169 U.S. 398 (1898). 
51. ld.at 409. 
52. ld. at 408-10. 
53. Costigan, supra note 19. 
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was paid for by one spouse and conveyed to both spouses as tenants by 
the entirety requires the resolution of several intricate legal questions. 
Should a resulting trust be presumed in favor of the spouse who 
furnished the consideration? Should the converse inference of a gift 
arise due to the close relationship of the parties and the fact that the 
payor has retained a portion of the beneficial interest? Should the 
presumption vary according to whether the paying spouse is the hus-
band or the wife? What should be the burden of proof required to 
overcome the selected presumption? If the gift presumption is em-
ployed, should evidence of an oral agreement that the non·paying 
spouse was to hold in trust for the paying spouse be allowed to rebut 
the presumption? If the paying spouse proves such an agreement, what 
form should the remedy take-a resulting trust or a constructive trust? 
The facts of Ensor v. Ensor provided the court of appeals with an 
opportunity to articulate the Maryland position on these issues. Al-
though the court looked to another jurisdiction for persuasive anal-
ysis,5 4 it clearly indicated5 5 that it found a strong basis for its decision 
in the earlier Maryland case of Reed v. Reed. 5 6 
In Reed, a wife brought a bill of complaint asking that a decree 
declare her to be the sole owner of land which was conveyed to her and 
her husband as tenants by the entirety on a consideration that she 
furnished.57 The court said: 
It has been repeatedly held by this court that if a wife gives to 
her husband property belonging to her or her separate estate, or 
permits him to apply it to his own use, or he does so with her 
knowledge and consent, in the absence of proof that it was 
given to him to be held in trust for her use, or of a promise by 
the husband at the time to repay it, it will be presumed that it 
was intended as an absolute gift to him, and she has no claim 
therefor against him or his estate.s 8 
Since the only allegation in Mrs. Reed '8 bill was that she had paid for 
the property,s 9 there was no basis for a trust, and the court thereby 
inferred that she had intended a gift.60 Mrs. Reed, however, brought 
evidence to show that her husband used undue influence to induce her 
to convey the property to them as tenants by the entirety, although her 
bill of complaint did not allege this.6 1 Citing Maryland authority that a 
gift from a wife to her husband should be examined for evidence that 
54. 270 Md. 540, 561, 312 A.2d 286, 292 (1973) where the court referred to Rayher v. Rayher; 
14 N.J. 174, 101 A.2d 524 (1953), as "persuasive." 
55. 270 Md~ at 55:f-56, 312 A.2d 289-91. 
56. 109 Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909). 
57. Id. at 691-92, 72 A. at 414. 
58. Id at 692; 72 A. at 415" (citations omitted), emphasis added where it was later added by 
the Ensor court. 
59. Id. at 692, 72 A. at 414-15. 
GO. Id. at 694, 72 A. at 415. 
61. Id. at 694-95, 72 A. at 415. 
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the gift was obtained through fraud or undue influence and that it 
would not be upheld under those conditions,6 2 the court remanded the 
case in order that the bill could be amended and the parties given an 
opportunity to offer additional evidence on this point.6 3 
Before Reed, Maryland decisions on this issue had involved situations 
where a husband had used or appropriated the personal property of his 
wife with her consent.6 4 In these cases, the courts declared that when a 
wife's funds had been used by her husband with her acquiesence, she 
would have no claim against him or his estate unless he had made a 
promise to repay,65 to treat the money as her separate estate,6 6 or to 
invest it for her use.67 For example, in Tyson v. Tyson,68 the court 
concluded that a gift had be~n made by a wife to her husband, after 
noting specifically that the evidence did not show that a loan or trust 
was created between them. Additional earlier Maryland decisions had 
expressly stipulated that the presumption of a gift may in any case be. 
rebutted by evidence manifesting a clear intention that the donee was 
to take as trustee.69 
The Reed court clearly relied on these cases which presumed a gift 
when a wife's personal property was conveyed to or appropriated by 
her husband, and, by employing their rationale, extended it, along wIth 
the attendant exceptions, to apply to the situation where a wife used 
her funds to purchase real property in the names of her husband and 
herself as tenants by the entirety. This reasoning process was actually a 
condition precedent to the action taken by the court in first presuming 
the intention to make a gift, and then remanding the issue to the court 
below for the presentation of further evidence relative to fraud or 
undue influence. 
Various texts, authorities and cases in other jurisdictions have cited 
Reed as authority for the proposition that the presumption of a gift 
may be upheld only in the absence of proof establishing a contrary 
intent.70 However the Mary land decisions preceding Ensor appeared to 
ignore the underlying rationale of Reed and instead apparently inter-
preted the case solely on the basis of the final action taken by the 
court.7 I An understanding of the interpretation which the intervening 
62. Id. at 695-96, 72 A. at 416. 
63. Id. at 696, 72 A. at 416. 
64. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Middleton, 68 Md. 540, 13 A. 155 (1888); Farmers and Merchants' 
Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 65 Md. 245, 3 A. 302 (1886); Taylor v. Brown, 65 Md. 366, 4 A. 888 
(1886); Kuhn v. Stansfield, 28 Md. 210 (1868); Edelin v. Edelin, 11 Md. 415 (1857). 
65. Farmers and Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 65 Md. 245, 3 A. 302 (1886); Kuhn v. 
Stansfield, 28 Md. 210 (1868); Edelin v. Edelin, 11 Md. 415 (1857). 
66. Farmers and Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Jenkins, 65 Md. 245, 3 A. 302 (1886). 
frl. Id. 
68. 54 Md. 35 (1880). 
69. See, e.g., Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Deale, 18 Md. 26 (1861), the landmark Maryland case on 
this point. 
70. Haguewood v. Britain, 273 Mo. 89, 199 S.W. 950 (1917); 41 AM. JUR. 2d, Husband and 
Wife § 95, at 96 (1968); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 917 (1955). 
71. See discussion in this casenote at pp. 167-68 infra, and other cases which have cited 
Reed as authority for the proposition that the gift presumption prevails unless there is 
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cases imputed to Reed is therefore essential to an understanding of the 
effect of Ensor on Maryland law. 
Although earlier cases72 alluded to Reed, it was in Gunter v. 
Gunter,73 thirty-eight years later, that the Maryland court first expli-
cated its interpretation of Reed with reference to the presumption of a 
gift. In Gunther, the court stated, in dictum, that Reed stood for the 
proposition that: "[I] n the absence of fraud or undue influence, the 
courts will not inquire into the contributions of the parties [to a 
tenancy by the entirety] prior to the joint acquisition .... "74 Subse-
quently, in Anderson v. Anderson, 7 5 referring to the down payment a 
wife had made on property conveyed to herself and her husband as 
tenants by the entirety, the court said, citing Reed: "In legal effect, and 
in the absence of proof that it was not her voluntary act, this transac-
tion on its face amounted to an absolute gift.'" 6 Both these statements 
from Gunter and Anderson were then quoted in McCally v. McCally, 77 
in which the court rejected a husband's contention that a presumed 
evidence of fraud or undue influence, e.g., Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 A. 635 (1923); 
Lewis v. Lewis, 140 Md. 524, ll8 A. 65 (1922). 
72. See, e.g., Young v. Diedel, 141 Md. 670, ll9 A. 448 (1922); Braecklin v. Braecklin, 
139 Md. 341, 115 A. ll8 (1921); Beggs v. Erb, 138 Md. 345, ll3 A. 881 (1921); Equita-
ble Ice Co. v. Moore, 127 Md. 322, 96 A. 444 (1915), which cited Reed on the issue of 
whether a case may be remanded for further hearing on evidence of a complaint not 
alleged in the original bill. Other cases cited Reed as authority for the proposition that a 
tenancy by the entirety is converted into a ten,ancy in common on a divorce a vinculo. 
See, e.g., Blenard v. Blenard, 185 Md. 548, 45 A.2d 335 (1946); Crise v. Smith, 150 Md. 
322, 133 A. llO (1926); Meyers v. East End Loan & Say. Ass'n, 139 Md. 607, ll6 A. 
453 (f922); Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916); Nihiser v. Nihiser, 
127 Md. 451, 96 A. 611 (1916). Additional cases cited Reed as authority for the proposition 
that proof of fraud or undue influence may negate the gift. Beard v. Beard, 185 Md. 
178, 44 A.2d 469 (1945); Hall v. Hall, 180 Md. 353, 24 A.2d 415 (1942); Tillinghast v. 
Lamp, 168 Md. 34, 176 A. 629 (1935); Hillwood v. Hillwood, 159 Md. 167, 150 A. 286 
(1930). See also cases cited note 71 supm. 
73. 187 Md. 228, 49 A.2d 454 (1946). 
74. Id. at 231, 49 A.2d at 456. The court reversed the chancellor's denial of a divorced 
husband's request for partition by sale of a leasehold property, formerly held by him and 
his wife as tenants by the entirety, because he was in default on alimony payments. 
There was no allegation by either party that one had contributed more than the other 
toward the purchase of the property. The court also cited Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 
A.2d 633 (1923), which had cited Reed on another point, as authority for the quoted 
statement. Neither Brell nor Reed use this language, nor does an examination of either 
case reveal any inference of such a broad proposition. 
75. 215 Md. 483, 138 A.2d 880(1958). 
76. [d. at 488-89, 138 A.2d at 883. The wife in Anderson claimed that she was entitled to 
the return of her money because it constituted an investment in a business in which she 
said she was a partner with her husband. The business had been dissolved. The court said 
that, regardless of a partnership, nothing in the partnership act would' prevent the 
partners from agreeing on the title of specific assets and hel4 that a gift had been made to 
the husband of an interest in the tenancy by the entirety. However, the Anderson court 
concluded its decision by stating: "Starting with the presumption of a gift ... [w]e cannot 
find that the chancellor was clearly wrong in finding no intention to change the legal title 
to the premises from !i tenancy by the entireties to some other form of ownership." [d. at 
489, 138 A.2d at 884. Other Maryland cases citing Reed for the proposition that this 
transaction constitutes an absolute gift in the absence of fraud or undue influence have 
also continued to discuss the intention of the donor elsewhere. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 
140 Md. 524, 527, ll8 A. 65, 66 (1922). 
77. 250 Md. 541, 544-45, 243 A.2d 538, ~1 (1968). 
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"gift" to his wife of her interest in property which he had bought and 
placed in a tenancy by the entirety was actually conditioned on her 
fidelity and on the continuation of their marriage. The husband as-
serted that the property should be returned to him since he had been 
granted a divorce on the grounds of adultery.78 Although the husband 
in McCally was attempting to establish a constructive trust, it is ap-
parent from the language used by the court that a resulting trust would 
also have been rejected. 7 9 
In each of these three cases, the court ignored the trust exception set 
out by the Reed court to the presumption of a gift and apparently 
construed Reed to stand for the narrow proposition that only proof of 
fraud or undue influence could rebut the presumption. A justification 
for this narrow construction of Reed cannot be found in the facts of 
the interpreting cases.80 Rather, it appears, these cases, and those 
which subsequently followed this construction,8 1 failed to take note of 
the language in Reed to the effect that the gift presumption arises only 
in the absence of circumstances indicating a contrary intention. The 
Ensor court, however, took specific note of this "underlying premise" 
of Reed, and. affirmed its validity .82 Ensor thus adopted the majority 
view8 3 that the presumption of a gift may also be negated by evidence 
that the spouse who paid for the property had a contrary intention.84 
78. The husband in McCally also argued that public policy should dictate that an adulterous 
spouse should not be unjustly enriched as a result of his or her culpable conduct. Where 
property is held by the entirety and the wrongdoing spouse had not contributed to the 
purchase of the property, he contended, the court should impress upon the interest of the 
wrongdoer a constructive trust in favor of the innocent party after the couple was divorced 
a vinculo. [d. at 545, 243 A.2d at 540. This doctrine of divestiture of the culpable spouse 
has been adopted in some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 278 F. 1017 (D.C. Cir. 
1922), where the court said: 
ITlhe husband must be supposed to have given and the wife to have accepted with 
the implied condition that the property should not be used ... for the maintenance 
of one who had ... repudiated him as a husband; that the real consideration of such 
a conveyance was marriage !lIld the continuance of the married state, which failed 
when by such an act the relation was rendered intolerable. [d. at 1018 (citations 
omitted). 
79. 250 Md. at 548, 243 A.2d at 542. 
80. See text at notes 74-79 supra. 
81. See, e.g., Hardy v. Hardy, 250 F. Supp. 956, 961 (D.D.C. 1966), where the court cited 
Reed, Anderson; Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 A. 635 (1923), which had also cited 
Reed for the following statement: 
(U)nder Maryland law, absent a showing of fraud, coercion, misrepresenta-
tion or undue influence at the time of the transaction, placing title in a tenancy 
by the entirety works as an absolute gift to the non-paying spouse of an equal 
interest. 
Only one Maryland case, Burleigh v. Miller, 209 Md. 57, 120 A.2d 378 (1956), has 
previously quoted the entire statement from Reed which is quoted at p. 165 supra. There 
the court did not fmd Reed to be applicable since the parties involved were a married man 
and his paramour, not a married couple. However, in one case occurring after Reed, the 
court ruled that an initial presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the wife would arise 
where her money was used to purchase land in her husband's name alone. Reed was not 
mentioned. Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Md. 44, 90 A. 846 (1914). 
82. 270 Md. at 554, 312 A.2d at 289. 
83. See Annot., 43 A.L.R2d 917, § 5, at 926(1955). 
84. 270 Md. at 554, 312 A.2d at 289. 
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The Ensor court's interpretation of Reed is clearly at variance with the 
interpretation given to the case by the Gunter, McCally and Anderson 
courts. 
The Ensor court reconciled its position with that of Anderson by 
pointing out that other language in the Anderson case implied that on a 
proper state of facts a finding could have been made that there was no 
intention by the wife to make a gift.85 Ensor attempted to distinguish 
Gunter and McCally, but whether it accomplished this is questionable. 
The court said: 
We do not understand these cases as having rejected the result-
ing trust theory. Gunter and McCally are not in conflict with 
our holding here when our concern is not the respective con-
tributions of the parties, but the question of title in accordance 
with the understanding of the parties at the time of the con-
veyance .... 86 
This distinction is ambiguous. While the Gunter and McCally courts did 
not explicitly reject the resulting trust theory, they certainly implied as 
much by stating that they would not inquire into the respective 
contributions of the parties to a tenancy by the entirety in the absence 
of proof of fraud or undue influence.8 7 It is obviously impossible for a 
complainant to successfully assert a resulting trust unless the co~ 
allows him to prove his contribution to the estate.8 8 The distinction is 
further rendered implausible because of the fact that the Ensor court 
was, despite its statement to the contrary, manifestly concerned with 
the "respective contributions of the parties" since Mrs. Ensor had to 
prove not only that she intended to retain the beneficial title to the 
property, but also that she made the down payment. 
The question arises as to the extent to which the Gunter and McCally 
decisions are affected by the Ensor court's inability to reconcile the 
interpretations those cases gave to Reed with its own. The Gunter 
holding is not adversely affected, since that case mentioned Reed only 
in dictum, and its facts provided no basis for a resulting trust.8 9 The 
reasoning of the McCally decision, however. which relied solely on a 
narrow interpretation of Reed, is obviously undermined by the Ensor 
rationale.9 0 Future decisions dealing with the issues raised in M r.Cally 
85.Id. 
86. Id., 312 A.2d at 291. 
87. See pp. 167-68 supra, discussing Gunter and McCally. 
88. See p. 160 supra. 
89. See note 74 supra. 
90. The McCally court's sole authority for its rejection of the husband's contention that he 
had made a conditional gift to his wife of her interest in a tenancy by the entirety, and 
that the condition had been broken, was its indirect reliance on Reed, via Gunter and 
Anderson. See p. 167 supra. It is unclear whether the McCally court merely spoke too es-
pansively or whether it actually misinterpreted these cases when it stated that the law in 
Maryland was that the courts would not inquire into the contribution of the parties to a 
tenancy by the entirety prior to their joint acquisition unless fraud or undue influence 
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should, therefore, logically be based on another rationale,91 even 
though the En.wr court clearly intended to note that McCally is still 
good law.92 
The Ensor court augmented its rationale for finding a resulting trust 
in its reference to Rayher v. Rayher,9 3 a New Jersey case. Therein, a 
wife who had been given some property as a wedding gift placed it in a 
tenancy by the entirety, at her husband's suggestion, to facilitate its 
management. The husband orally promised to relinquish his interest if 
his wife requested. The property was then sold, the husband quitclaim-
ing94 his interest, and other property was bought with the proceeds 
and also placed in a tenancy by the entirety. When the couple was later 
divorced, the court returned the property to the wife, basing its 
decision on the following language from the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts, which it interpreted as establishing an exception to the 
presumption of a gift: 
The fact that the payor takes title to property in the name of 
himself and another jointly is an indication of an intention of 
the payor to make a beneficial gift of an undivided interest in 
the property to the other person; and in the absence of evidence 
of a different intention of the payor, the other person does not 
hold his interest upon a resulting trust for the payor.9 5 
was proved, and that in the absence of such proof, an absolute gift would be presumed. 
Regardless of this, the interpretation of Reed which the McCally court derived, and its 
reliance thereon, is inconsistent with the Ensor court's reliance on Reed in establishing 
resulting trust in Mrs. Ensor's favor on the basis of the agreement between the couple. 
9!. It would be contradictory for the Maryland courts to now resort to a narrow interpretation 
of Reed to reject a contention by a spouse who has paid for property held in a tenancy by 
the entirety that the "gift" was subject to a condition, if both husband and wife 
understood and agreed to the condition. Such an agreement might, however, be 
distinguishable from the type of agreement made by Mr. and Mrs. Ensor, especially ifthe 
agreement might be construed as one made in contemplation of divorce. Generally, 
provisions in antenuptial contracts regarding tpe disposition of property in the event of 
divorce are held to be contrary to public policy and void. I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 
26.1, at 393 (1973). Some courts would likely strike down such agreements in postnuptial 
contracts on the same "grounds, although an argument could be made that the public 
policy rationale should not be invoked as strongly against contracts made after marriage. 
In at least two cases the courts have refused to declare a resulting trust in favor of a 
spouse who made a conditional gift to the other spouse when the condition was not met. 
See Brod v. Brod, 390 TIl. 312, 61 N.E.2d 675 (1945), Coffman v. Coffman, 414 
S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1967). But see Porter v. Porter, 168 Md. 287, 177 A. 460 (1935), where 
a husband alleged that he had conveyed land to his wife with the understanding that each 
would make a will" leaving their entire property to the other, and that his wife had 
subsequently destroyed her will to defeat the agreement. The court found that the wife 
had not destroyed her will, and thus rejected the husband's content that a resulting 
trust should be declared in his favor. The court did not, however, reject the theory of the 
bill. 
92. See p. 169 supra, for language used by the Ensor court. 
93. 17 N.J. 174, 101 A.2d 524 (1953). 
94. "A release or acquittance given to one man by another, in respect of any action that he 
has or might have against him. Also acquitting or giving up one's claim or title." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1417 (4th ed. 1968). 
95. 17 N.J. at 181-83, 101 A.2d at 528-29. The quoted language is from THE RESTATEMENT 
(S~OND) OF TRUSTS § 441, comment e with the Rayher court's emphasis added. 
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The Ensor court stated that it found Rayher persuasive and in accord 
with its own previous decision in Bowis v. Bowis. 9 6 Although the 
Bowis case involved the separate securities of a wife which were placed 
in a joint account, the Maryland Court of Appeals had similarly held 
that the property "did not represent a jointly held asset of the parties 
as the husband had never contributed anything toward the PUl-
chase ... nor had the wife ever made a gift to him of any inter-
est ... "9 7 The position taken by the court in Ensor, which involved 
realty, is thus compatible with its holding in Bowis, which concerned 
personal property,9 8 its previous language in Reed,9 9 and the Restate-
ment (Second), of Trusts.1 00 It is interesting to note that this view 
implies that when there is evidence that a gift was not intended, the 
presumption of a gift does not arise, despite the fact that the parties 
share a relationship which would normally raise such a presumption. 
This position correlates with the Ensor court's finding of a resulting 
trust, as opposed to a constructive trust, in the wife's favor. Recogniz-
ing the fine line which sometimes divides the two, the court found the 
question of "title in accordance with the understanding of the 
parties ... [to be] allied with our previous pronouncements relative to 
fraud and undue influence.,,1 OlIn addition, the court referred to 
Schwarz v. United States, 1 0 2 a federal case arising in Maryland. which 
suggested that the circumstances of a particular case may sometimes 
give rise to either a constructive or resulting trust. In Schwarz, a wife 
had ·purchased property with her separate funds and placed the realty in 
a tenancy by the entirety. It was reve8Ied later that the husband was 
legally married to another woman at the time of the conveyance. The 
court declared a resulting trust in the second wife's favor, stating: 
Whether the trust be considered a trust resulting to the wife 
because of the failure of the purpose of the conveyance and of 
her having furnished the purchase m,oney, or as a constructive 
trust raised in her favor because of the fraud practiced upon her 
as to the marital status of her husband, we think there CAn be 
no doubt that the equitable title to the propeny was in 
her .... 103 
There is Maryland authority for finding a constructive trust on facts 
analogous to those in Ensor. 1 04 The Ensor court, however, having 
96. 259 Md. 41, 267 A.2d 84 (1970). 
97. 1d. at 45, 267 A.2d at 86. 
98. 1d. at 41, 267 A.2d at 84. 
99. 109 Md. at 692,72 A. at 415. 
100. See p. 170 supra. 
101. 270 Md. at 557, 312 A.2d at 291. 
102. 191 F.2d 618 (4th Cir.-1951). 
103. 1d. at 623. 
104. See Leupold v. Leupold, 156 Md. 516, 144 A. 647 (1929). There a husband alleged that he 
had conveyed property held by his wife and himself as tenants by the entirety to hel' 
name alone on an agreement that she would divide the property equally, which she later 
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accepted the Restatement (Second) of Trusts position that the 
presumption of a gift arises in the absence of a contrary intention of 
the spouse who paid for the property, logically concluded that a 
resulting trust is re-established once the contrary intention is shown. 
Not only is this the more generally accepted rationale, lOS but, despite 
the contrary authority, 1 06 it would also seem to require less circuitous 
reasoning than that required to establish a constructive trust. AE. 
outlined previously, the establishment of a constructive trust necessi-
tates the extinction of all presumptions and a showing of unjust 
enrichment. 1 0 7 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the basic rationale nor the holding of the Ensor court is 
surprising; both are in accord with established legal principles. The 
action taken by the court is consistent with the fundamental premise of 
the law of gifts and trusts that the intention of the parties is of primary 
importance. l 08 It affirms that valid agreements between husband and 
wife regarding their respective rights in property constitute evidence of 
their intentions and are enforceable under modern contract and prop-
erty law. 1 0 9 The decision reiterates the generally accepted view that a 
purchaser's intent to retain the beneficial interest of property he has 
placed in another's name will be given effect through the implication of 
a resulting trust. l lO 
The Ensor court merely applied these principles, for the first time in 
Maryland, to a conflict over the beneficial ownership of property which 
was purchased by one sp,?use and placed in a tenancy by the entirety. 
The language and rationale of previous Maryland cases, other than 
Reed, had created the erroneous impression that such circumstances 
would raise an absolute presumption of a gift, rebuttable only by proof 
that the gift was fradulently induced. The significance of Ensor is that 
it repudiated this narrow concept by holding that once Mrs. Ensor 
established her intent to retain the entire beneficial interest in the 
property, she was entitled to a resulting trust. The Ensor decision 
reflects the view of the majority of jurisdictions which have dealt with 
this situation.1 1 1 In dictum, the court indicated that the interest of a 
refused to do, claiming a gift had been made. The court held that if it were proved that 
the wife had procured the title from her husband on a subsequently repudiated promise to 
divide the property equally, a ground was constituted upon which a constructive trust 
could be declared and enforced. 
105. See BOGERT § 461, at 619. 
106. See Costigan, note 19 supra. 
107. See BOGERT § 495 for a general discussion of the rationale for establishing a constructive 
trust under these circumstances. 
108. See, e.g., Beard v. Beard, 185 Md. 178,44 A.2d 469 (1945); Hutson v. Hutson, 168 Md. 
182, 177 A. 177 (1935). 
109. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 20 (1971) provides that a married woman may contract with 
her husband and sue and be sued as if she were a femme sole. 
no. See note 30 supra. 
111. See note 83 supra. 
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husband who purchases property and places it in a tenancy by the 
entirety in similar circumstances will also be protected.11 2 
The Ensor case also has a more general relevance. When viewed in the 
light of other recent casesl 1 3 involving the property rights of divorced 
spouses, the decision indicates a progressive tendency on the part of the 
Maryland courts to give increased weight to agreements between the 
husband and wife and other circumstances in their marriage as evidence 
of their intentions in property transactions. The court has apparently 
begun to recognize that many married people no longer adopt their 
traditional social and economic roles, and that time-worn presumptions 
of intent predicated on these roles should not always prevail. 
The result of Ensor is to allow husbands and wives to place their 
separate property in a tenancy by the entirety to facilitate its manage-
ment, to lessen their personal financial liability, and to avoid some of 
the costs of estate settlement if their relationship continues harmoni-
ously until the death of one spouse. In the event of a divorce, they may 
secure the return of their investment if it was made under an agreement 
that it· was to be held in trust. Although some may urge that decisions 
such as Ensor will create a tendency among married persons to use the 
tenancy by the entirety as a vehicle for fraud upon creditors, or upon 
each other, the potential is somewhat vitiated by statutory provi-
sions,l 1 4 and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 1 1 5 While many fac-
tors should be considered before property is placed in an estate by the 
entirety,l 1 6 this type of joint ownership is certainly made a more 
viable option by the Ensor decision. 
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112. 270 Md. at 562, 312 A.2d at 293. 
113. A good example is Bowis v. Bowis, 259 Md. 41, 267 A.2d 84 (1970), the facts of which are 
discussed at p. 171 supra. Others are Lingo v. Lingo, 267 Md. 707, 299 A.2d 11 (1973), 
where the courts held that a husband's contribution to a tenancy by the entirety after the 
couple had separated, but before they were divorced, should be returned to him, and the 
more recent case of Gosman v. Gosman, 271 Md. 514,318 A.2d 821 (1974), where the court 
upheld a rmding that a wife was a partner in her husband's business and awarded her fifty 
per cent of its fair market value. 
114. MD. ANN. CODE art. 45, § 1 (1971), provides that a transfer of property from one spouse to 
another is invalid when it has been made in prejudice of the rights of creditors. The 
creditors, however, to assert their rights must file claims within three years after the 
acquisition of the property or be absolutely barred. 
115. See BOGERT § 463. 
116. See NYSBA Panel, Joint Property, Its Virtues and Vices, 111 TRUSTS AND Es 446 
(1972), for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of owning property as 
tenants by the entirety. 
